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Abstract—Blockchain’s immutability can resist unauthorized
changes of ledgers, thus it can be used as a trust enhancement
mechanism to a shared system. Indeed, blockchain has been
considered to solve the security and privacy issues of the Internet
of Things (IoT). In this regard, most researches currently focus on
the realization of various access control models and architectures,
and are working towards making full use of the blockchain to
secure IoT systems. It is worth noting that there has been an
increasingly heavy pressure on the blockchain storage caused by
dealing with massive IoT data and handling malicious access
behaviors in the system, and not many countermeasures have
been seen to curb the increase. However, this problem has not
been paid enough attention. In this paper, we implement an
attribute-based access control scheme using smart contracts in
Quorum blockchain. It provides basic access control functions
and conserves storage by reducing the number of smart contracts.
In addition, a reputation-based technique is introduced to cope
with malicious behaviors. Certain illegal transactions can be
blocked by the credit-assessment algorithm, which deters possibly
malicious nodes and gives more chance to well-behaved nodes.
The feasibility of our proposed scheme is demonstrated by doing
experiment on a testbed and conducting a case study. Finally,
the system performance is assessed based on experimental mea-
surement.
Index Terms—Internet of Things (IoT), access control,
blockchain, smart contract, Quorum, Attribute-Based Access
Control (ABAC).
I. INTRODUCTION
There is no doubt that the Internet of Things (IoT) is per-
vading every aspect of our daily life. With the sharp increase
in the number of smart devices, IoT has influenced many
vertical domains: homes, transportation, health, buildings,
cities, industries, and even our human bodies [1]. However,
the resource and capability constraint of IoT devices and
complex IoT network structures bring up significant security
and privacy concerns. Adversaries can gain illegal access to
the devices to get crucial data or take over the control of
the devices to initiate malicious actions [2]. The consequence
can be privacy leaking, system failure and even body injuries.
Access control is an important line to guard the IoT systems
against security and privacy threats. However, traditional ac-
cess control schemes heavily rely on centralized authorities
for access validation at risk of single point of failure, without
users’ control over their own data [3]. It is essential and urgent
to find effective ways to secure IoT access control.
A blockchain is a decentralized security framework with
transparent, Byzantine fault-tolerant, immutable, and chrono-
logical ledgers maintained by distributed users. In recent years,
it has received broad attention from both academia and indus-
try because of its decentralized management mechanism, and
many researchers have applied it to the field of access control
to replace the centralized authorization entity with the trusted
platform [4]. Dorri et al. proposed a blockchain-based access
control architecture that consists of smart homes, an overlay
network and cloud storage [5]. They added a policy header in
the blockchain block to store access control policies and autho-
rize devices. ControlChain is another architecture to provide
access control in IoT [6]. It realizes all functions through the
cooperation of four different blockchains. Djilali et al. used
hierarchical architecture to alleviate the computation overhead
in their scheme and developed a new distributed access control
system for IoT using blockchain [7]. In particular, in a specific
smart factory scenario, Wan et al. also used the blockchain
to implement an access control system in hierarchical struc-
ture. They introduced the whitelist mechanism, asymmetric
encryption mechanism, and other methods to improve the
security and privacy. [8]. All the above schemes focus on
architecture design and are lack of expression capability to
describe access rights in sufficient details in defining various
functions. Fortunately, the blockchain smart contracts can
solve this problem.
A smart contract is an agreement that can be self-executed
without involving a third party. This key concept was first
introduced by Ethereum in 2013 [9]. Most smart contracts use
the Turing-complete language which can be used to implement
complex logic and applications, such as various access control
mechanisms and architectures. Because of this, one can see
many recent research reports based on smart contracts to
achieve access control in untrustworthy IoT environments.
Novo et al. proposed a six-part architecture along with an
access management system implemented by a single smart
contract [10]. They focused on addressing scalability problem
and only provided a few access management functions. Huh
et al. proposed a simple contract system consisting of three
individual contracts to track electricity usage in terms of meter
value as well as policy values of air conditioner and lightbulb,
respectively [11]. The smart contract expression capability






















models in every detail. Riabi et al. chose a model that is
a combination of Capability-BAC (Capability based access
control) and Identity-BAC and used the smart contract to
store and manage an access control list (ACL) [12]. There are
also several more-sophisticated contract systems proposed by
researchers recently. The contract system proposed by Zhang
et al. consists of multiple access control contracts (ACCs), one
judge contract and one register contract to achieve distributed
and trustworthy access control for IoT [13]; and it also uses
ACL. Wang et al. implemented a traditional ABAC (attribute-
based access control) architecture by using smart contract [14].
Their scheme reduces storage occupancy but lacks dynamic
access right validation compared to the work in [13]. MedRec
is also a three-contract system being concerned with various
problems of electronic medical records in practical scenarios
[15]. These contract systems either aim to provide sufficient
access control capability or focus on specific scenarios. Since
little consideration is given to storage footprint, many proposed
schemes can result in rapid growth in blockchain volume.
Although the blockchain is relatively secure, it still carries
its own risks. There has been intensive research on improving
blockchain security by considering mechanisms such as users’
reputation. LVChain proposed by Yu et al. is a blockchain-
based architecture for IoT access authorization and has some
advantages enabled by its vote-based consensus algorithm
[16]. Huang et al. presented a blockchain system with credit-
based consensus mechanism for Industrial Internet of Things
(IIoT) [17], where credit value is used in Proof of Work
(PoW) mechanism to make adjustment between efficiency
and security in consensus depending on whether or not a
node is honest or malicious. However, these schemes are all
designed at blockchain level (e.g., blockchain network, block
header or consensus algorithm), instead of contract level. Still,
research on detecting malicious behaviors in the blockchain
access control systems is quite rare. Efforts on this particular
matter are typically from the perspective of dynamic access
control and use historical behavior and other contents to make
decisions on granting new access. For example, Hwang et al.
proposed a dynamic access control scheme to fit the dynamic
environment of IoT [18]. In their scheme, dynamic policy
creation upon receiving a data requesting has to be done
manually by the manager. Wan et al. also presented the idea
of dynamic access in their research [8]. Furthermore, in [13]
the authors even proposed to use malicious behavior detection
in their contract system.
To address the storage issues mentioned above and further
improve malicious behavior detection and processing capa-
bility in the contract system, we design and prototype an
access control system based on smart contract, and integrate
a credit-based misbehavior detection method to better protect
the IoT system against security and privacy threats. Our major
contributions can be summarized into the following three
aspects:
1) A new smart contract architecture for IoT access control
is designed by leveraging the ABAC model. It can
effectively reduce storage requirement and curb the rapid
growth of blockchain volume. This work is an extension
of smart contract-based framework proposed by Zhang
[13]. Different from theirs, our proposal consists of mul-
tiple ACCs, one management contract, and one reputation
contract. In particular, they use ACL to achieve access
control and we choose ABAC model.
2) We have designed a reputation assessment mechanism
and used it to discourage and deter malicious behaviors
during access control process, which is in favor of well-
behaved nodes and the overall security is enhanced. The
reputation calculation is similar to that in [17], but we
count the number of behaviors in the algorithm, instead
of the time elapsed. In addition, we block certain number
of requests to execute a penalty, while in [17] a penalty
is related to the difficulty value of the PoW algorithm.
3) To validate our proposed scheme and assess its per-
formance, we have designed and examined a prototype
based Quorum blockchain, conducted a case study of a
supply chain, and made experimental measurement for
performance assessment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents an overview of our proposed IoT system, the
blockchain platform and access model we use in this paper.
Section III describes the access control framework in details,
including three types of smart contracts. In Section IV, we
show the feasibility of our scheme using experiments and the
case study. Section V gives performance assessment results,
followed by conclusions in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
A. Platform
Some researchers have already analyzed the blockchain plat-
forms that meet the requirements for IIoT. According to [19],
it is believed that the top factors for platform selection include
protocol of block creations, consensus for block adding and
smart contract support; and Hyperledger stands out if giving
only four options: Corda, Hyperledger Fabric, Tendermint and
Symbiont. In our project, we choose Quorum [20] because of
the following three reasons. The first is that Quorum supports
multiple consensuses without degrading performance. As a
consortium blockchain, Quorum provides three consensuses
(Raft, Istanbul Byzantine Fault Tolerant (IBFT) and Clique
POA) and can process more transactions than others in a unit
time, which are highly preferred for the IoT environment. We
have noticed that Ethereum and PoW consensus is popular,
but PoW consensus does not yield satisfactory performance
for IoT applications. The second reason is that Quorum is
fully based on the official Go implementation of Ethereum
protocol, which makes it inheriting some advantages from
Ethereum. The active Ethereum community is beneficial for
solving technical problems and continuously applying new
theories. Different from some other blockchain platforms,
Ethereum has diverse architectures and can support a wide
range of clients. It is possible to run the software on various
IoT devices with different hardware architectures to serve
different types of clients. In addition, the deep integration
with Swarm [21] enables off-chain storage of unimportant
data. The last reason is privacy protection. In general, defining
policies for access control on the blockchain is not wise, since
the policies should not be seen by every participant [22].
However, in our opinion, the policies are necessary but should
have auditable and immutable features. Although there have
been a number of studies that use cryptography mechanisms
or other approaches like multi-party computing to address
privacy issues [23]. Quorum offers a simpler approach–private
transaction manager. It is able to keep transaction privacy
between the involved participants. In this way, transaction
and smart contract privacy can be preserved by preventing
unrelated participants from accessing the transaction content.
B. Architecture
IBFT is selected as our consensus algorithm. There are two
types of nodes with IBFT: validators and non-validators. Along
with the two types of nodes, the system also contains numer-
ous IoT devices (e.g., sensors and actuators). As illustrated in
Fig.1, all of these components form three layers of the IoT
system considered in this paper.
Fig. 1: Three-layer system architecture [7]
The validators are devices (e.g., servers) that are powerful
in terms of computation and storage, and responsible for
maintaining the blockchain and reaching the final consensus
state. The system can tolerate at most F faulty nodes in an N -
validator network, where N = 3F +1, implying there should
be at least four validators to tolerate one Byzantine fault [24].
The non-validators are normal nodes within the blockchain
network, and they may be IoT gateways or user devices in
our work. Each IoT gateway connects a cluster of third-layer
IoT devices via wireless or wired connection. User devices
(e.g., PCs, laptops) are used to connect and operate servers
and IoT gateways. A large number of IoT devices are at the
third layer, including 1) sensors for perceiving the environment
and sending the acquired data to the storage devices, and 2)
actuators acting according to their received control commands.
The IoT gateways serve as agents for these IoT devices in
the sense: 1) each gateway creates an independent blockchain
account for each of its child devices at the third layer; all
interactions like deploying smart contracts or calling a function
in the contract would be executed through these accounts;
and 2) they send requests from the blockchain to a device
or return responses from the device to the chain through some
middleware.
As shown in Fig.1, the blockchain network is overlaid on
top of the IoT network, where the IoT devices are not part of
the blockchain, and this is rational because the IoT network is
typically resource-constrained. Indeed, most of such devices
are difficult to run as Quorum clients, participate in consensus
process and communicate timely. In our system, Quorum
clients are running at all blockchain nodes but the IoT end
devices.
C. Access Control Model
Ouaddah et al. gave a review of access control in IoT
and classified different solutions into four layers: objectives,
models, architecture and mechanism [3]. From this point
of view, the implementation work based on smart contract
includes selecting models and making improvement at the
architecture and mechanism layers. In typical IoT applications,
each device may have some resources (e.g., data, storage space
or others) that are needed by other devices. A device can act
as a requester when it wishes to access the resources of other
devices. To abstract the access control problem, we adopt the
ABAC model [25] and define the following sets: objects O,
subject set S, resource set Ro and attribute set As (e.g., device
type or other customized attributes). Each object o ∈ O has
some resources ro ∈ Ro, and each subject s ∈ S has some
device attributes as ∈ As. For each resource ro ∈ Ro, we can
create some policies to allow only the subjects with specified
attributes as’s to access the resources. Whether the policies
are predefined or not, all access requests can be checked
automatically. For better implementation, we define device
attributes in a Management Contract (MC) and set policies
in the ACC of every device.
There are some other attribute-based access control schemes
using blockchain for IoT. Ding et al. proposed a novel
attribute-based access control scheme for IoT systems [26], but
they mainly used blockchain technology to record the distribu-
tion of attributes defined by the central authority in advance.
Their scheme is theoretically well defined and more like a
cryptography protocol of attribute distribution. The authors’
focus is on the distributed and non-tampering features of the
blockchain, instead of making full use of the potential of smart
contracts. In contrast, [22] presents a practical application of
ABAC model for the healthcare IoT environment. Although
the proposal is also based on smart contract, the access
control policy is not part of the smart contract. The policy
is implemented and executed off-chain, with consideration of
delay and privacy. We believe sufficient throughput can be
achieved if Quorum or some other platforms (e.g. IOTA [27])
are employed. Securing the policy is also necessary, therefore
we define policy in the smart contract rather than somewhere
off-chain. The ABAC model can be well implemented by the
smart contract, since it is able to describe every detail needed
for adapting to the time-varying IoT environment.
D. Threat Models and Proposed Countermeasures
For the sake of precise and clear description of our scheme,
we consider the following three threat models:
1) Threat model 1: A malicious node sends excessive num-
ber of requests within a given duration (counted in
blockchain blocks) to increase its chance of successful
access or cause network congestion intentionally.
2) Threat model 2: A malicious node violates normal policy
items.
3) Threat model 3: A malicious node violates importance
policy items, such as sending a request from an erroneous
place or in a wrong time
There are two kinds of contract cooperation in the system for
detecting and treating these malicious behaviors. All malicious
behaviors are detected inside the contract that makes the access
decision, and then the access behavior information is submitted
to the contract dedicated for reputation assessment to perform
penalty or toleration by considering the requester’s historical
behaviors.
E. Configurations
To apply the Quorum platform in our scheme, we need to
make some addition and adjustment as follows.
1) All validators’ accounts are generated when the
blockchain is created. If there is a new node that wants
to be a validator, a voting process is initiated and a new
validator is elected if majority of current validators vote
“pass”. A voting-process is not necessary for accepting a
non-validator node.
2) All devices in the system are differentiated by their
blockchain accounts, rather than some associated unique
identifiers.
3) In Quorum, any transaction that changes the state does
not actually consume gas because all the spending will be
returned to the associated node after execution. However,
a device does need some balance in its account if it wants
to send a transaction. A node creating a block does not get
a reward in IBFT, and all the balance is allocated when we
edit the genesis.json file before the geth init command is
executed. Therefore, we make a design such that when a
new node (validator or non-validator) joins the blockchain
network, the specified account called bank must transfer
a certain amount of ether (Ethereum currency unit) to
the new node. When a new device is connected to a
gateway, the gateway account must transfer some ether
to the device account newly generated.
III. ACCESS CONTROL FRAMEWORK
Our access control framework is built on smart contracts.
As illustrated in Fig. 2, the system consists of three types of
contracts (MC, RC and ACC). The functions can be divided
into two categories: basic functions of access control such as
attributes management, policies management, access request
processing and malicious behavior detection. The first category
of functions are accommodated by ACCs and MC, and they are
responsible for managing attributes and policies, and making
decisions upon receiving access requests. The main functions
of the second category are supported by RC (Reputation
Contract), and responsible for managing trustworthiness and
issuing reward and penalty.
Fig. 2: Illustration of smart contract system
A. Access Control Contract
We create and deploy an ACC for each device in the system.
An ACC is responsible for managing resources, environment
attributes and policies, and processing access requests related
to the device. When a new device is connected to a gateway,
its account will be created automatically and it will receive
some ether from the gateway. Then, the gateway will create
an ACC for this device and deploy it in the blockchain using
the device’s own account. The contract addresses of MC and
RC need to be passed using constructor when the ACC is
deployed. Note that there are only one MC and only one RC
in the whole system, and their addresses can only be updated
by the manager of the device. After being deployed, the ACC
must be registered in MC. This process will be discussed
below in Management Contract subsection.
There are three global environment attributes in our system,
namely minInterval, threshold and algorithm. minInterval is
the minimum allowable interval (in seconds) between two
successive requests. threshold is a number of requests in a
given period of time, such that exceeding this threshold is
judged as a malicious behavior. algorithm is used to determine
an outcome when policy items conflict, and the results are
either “denyoverries” or “allowoverrides”; the former means
that as long as a single policy item is not satisfied, the access
request is denied, while the latter is the opposite: as long as one
policy item is satisfied, the user is allowed to access [14]. In
addition, we define two requester-specific variables to record
the subject’s state. ToLR is the time at which the last request
occurs, and NoFR is the number of requests generated by a
specific subject within a given period of time. All subjects
have their own state variables.
The resource attributes of a device are also managed by its
ACC. We use AttrV = G(ro, AttrN) to define them, where
G represents the mapping, and AttrV and AttrN are the
value and name of the resource attribute, respectively. There
is no limit on the number of resource attributes, and also a
resource can have no attribute.
Defining and managing access control policies related to
the device’s resources is the main function of ACC. For each
action ac (e.g., read, write, etc.) associated with a resource ro,
there can be a corresponding policy. A policy is built on basic
policy items for the given attributes, and each policy item is
defined using the following five terms:
• attrOwner: the owner of the attribute; it can be subject or
object;
• attrName: the attribute name in current condition;
• operator: the operator between the attribute name and
attribute value; it can be >, <, or =.
• attrValue: the attribute value that needs to be satisfied.
• importance: the importance level of the condition, with 0
as its default corresponding to the least importance.
The logic value of each policy item is determined as follows.
We get actual attribute according attrOwner and attrName,
then compare it with attrValue based on the operator defined
above, leading to an logic value which is used as the logic
value of respective policy item. All policy item values are
combined using the default logic operator AND to form the
policy. There is no other logic operator like OR in the current
version.
The most important function of ACC is decision making
on accepting or rejecting an access request. The system
receives two strings describing resource and action as in-
put parameters. The address of a requester is used as the
subject address automatically. Solidity (a Contract-Oriented
Programming Language) does not provide a real timestamp,
and the timestamp we use is provided by the block when it is
collected. Therefore, there is still some security risk because
a miner could make influence on the timestamp. However, in
our scheme, the miners at the top layer do not involve specific
access operations, so they could not make much influence.
The major part of algorithm in pseudo code for access control
decision making is given in Algorithm 1. In line 2-3, a penalty
time (mumber of blocked access attempts) is given by MC. If
the time point is in the future, the request will be rejected
directly, and all the changes made inside the transaction will
be reverted; here we use require (a keyword in Solidity) to
judge on a condition. The portion of line 4-10 detects whether
there are frequent requests. Then, in line 11-25, policies and
attributes from MC and algorithm (one of the three global
environment attributes) are used to determine whether the
policy check is passed. behaviorID is used to mark the result
type, and the final result is given in line 38-41 according it.
If no policy related to the resource and action is defined, the
final result will be NotDefine. Also, it is worth knowing that
the result will be submitted to RC for further processing when
it emits as an event.
We provide all the basic functions (Add, Delete, Get and
Update) for management of policy and resource attributes.
Besides, considering that each ACC represents a device and
IoT devices are frequently added and removed, we implement
deleteACC() function which performs the self-destruct opera-
tion. Note that only the manager of the device can add new
Algorithm 1: Access control decision making
Input : resource, action
Output: subject, result, behavior ID, block number
1 subject← requester address
/* Define global variables in there,
include behaviorCheck,
policyCheck, behavior ID, result[]
and finalResult */
2 if mc.getTLFB(subject) ≥ block.number then
3 transaction revert
4 if block.number − ToLR ≤ minInterval then
5 NoFR++
6 if NoFR ≤ threshold then
7 behaviorCheck ← true
8 else
9 NoFR← 0
10 behaviors[subject].T oLR← block.timestamp
11 if The number of policies = 0 then
12 return ”NotDefine”
13 for each policy p[i] related to resource and action
and !behaivorCheck do




17 attrV alue← resource.attrV alue
18 if attrValue and p[i].attrValue not satified
p[i].operator then
19 currentPolicy ← true
20 if currentPolicy then
21 result[1]++




26 if algorithm = ”denyoverrides”and result[1] > 0
then
27 policycheck ← true
28 if algorithm = ”allowoverrides” and result[0] = 0
then
29 policycheck ← true
30 if behaviorCheck and !policycheck then
31 behaviorID = 1
32 if !behaviorCheck and policycheck then
33 if result[2] ¿ 0 then
34 behaviorID = 3
35 else
36 behaviorID = 2
38 if policycheck or behaviorcheck then
39 finalResult = ”deny”;
40 else
41 finalResult = ”allow”;
42 rc.reputationCompute(subject, finalResult, behaviorID,
block number);
43 Trigger event ReturnAccessResult(subject, fianlResult,
behaviorID, block number);
44 return finalResult;
policy items, update or delete existing policies, and delete the
ACC.
B. Management Contract
MC is deployed upon the blockchain is created. Its main
role is to manage the information of RC and device (role as
requester) attributes.
When a device joins the blockchain network, in addition to
deploying the ACC associated with it, its attributes are also
needed to be register in the MC. The eight fields of a lookup
table we use for defining and searching these attributes are
defined as:
• isValued: This field is used for repeatability check, if a
device is registered, the value is true.
• managerAddress: For the gateway, it is the blockchain
account address of the gateway; for a device, it is the
blockchain account address of the gateway the device
belongs to;
• scAddress: The smart contract address of the ACC asso-
ciate with a device.
• deviceID: The UUID of device.
• deviceType: Device type, e.g., Loudness Sensor.
• deviceRole: Device role, e.g., validator, manager or de-
vice.
• TLFB: The last forbid block, 0 if unblocked,
• customized: Attributes that can be customized; the num-
ber of these attributes can be zero.
The first seven are fixed attributes, and the last one is a
customizable attribute. All fixed attributes must be set when
the device is registered, and the customizable attributes can
be added afterward. An example of lookup table is shown in
Table I. A key field of lookup table is the blockchain account
address which is the unique identity of a device in the system.
The structure we use to manage RC includes three fields:
isValued, creator and scAddress. The first one is used for
repeatability check, the second one is the node account who
has created and deployed the RC, and the last one is the
address of the RC. In contrast to the management of device
attributes that includes four basic operations (Register, Delete,
Get and Update), the management of RC includes only three
operations (Register, Get and Update). Deletion of RC is not
allowed because it will cause a system crash.
C. Reputation Contract
Following the deployment of the MC, the RC is created,
deployed, and registered in the MC. The main function of RC
is to use the behavioral information submitted by ACCs to
calculate the reputation level, so as to reward or punish the
devices. We have designed an algorithm to calculate reputation
based on all current and previous behaviors. The credit of
device i is defined as
Ci = λ1C
P
i − λ2CNi (1)
which is composed of two parts: CPi , the positive part due to
normal behaviors, and CNi , the negative part due to malicious
behaviors; and they are weighted by λ1 and λ2, respectively.
The negative part of the credit value CNi actually represents
a penalty, and it is related to the number and type of malicious
behaviors in the past, importance of the policy violated and so
on. Taking into account implementation limitation, the penalty







where mi is the total number of malicious behaviors to be
considered for device i, k is the chronological index of a ma-
licious behavior in the past, with k=0 for the earliest behavior,
αk is the penalty coefficient of the malicious behaviors k,
representing a severeness level within the range of 1 − 10.
Note that 1mi−k in the formula acts as a weighing factor that
varies depending on when a malicious behavior appears, and
the impact of each malicious behavior decreases gradually
over time, but it will never disappear. The malicious behaviors
under consideration fall into three types and they are assigned
IDs 1, 2 and 3, repectively:
1) High frequency request: its behavior ID is 1.
2) Policy check failed: its behavior ID is 2.
3) Importance check failed:, e.g., if the ”importance” field
of a policy item is not 0 (abnormal), this policy item
check fails, corresponding to a more serious situation; its
behavior ID is 3.
Any behavior cannot be judged as belonging to more than
one type of malicious behavior at the same time. If there
is ambiguity in categorizing a phenomenon, labelling it with
the ID corresponding to a higher priority. For example, if a
behavior can be classified as both the second or the third types,
label the behavior with ID 3.
The positive part of the credit value CPi can also be called







where CPi,max is a pre-defined upper limit on C
P
i for prevent-
ing unlimited accumulation of rewards, li is the total number
of normal behaviors to be considered for device i, k is the
chronological index of a normal behaviors in the past, k1 is
the index of the first normal behavior after the last penalty
TABLE I: An example of lookup table in MC
isValued managerAddress scAddress DeviceID deviceType deviceRole TLFB customized
true 0xbffe· · · 59e0 0x2C2F· · · 1D08 Server23 server manager 0 NULL









was made, and ωk is the weight on the normal behavior k.
Currently only one type of normal behavior, i.e, authorized
access is considered for testing, and its behavior ID is 0.
Obviously, this list can be expanded to include more normal
types.
Every behavior submitted automatically updates its respec-
tive behavior list, and then the value of penalty or reward is re-
calculated to determine a new credit value. If this credit value
is less than 0, the number of forbid blocks will be calculated,
and the corresponding TLFB attribute of the device in MC will
be updated; at the same time, k1 will be updated. When CPi is
calculated next time, the normal behaviors before the index of
k1 will not be counted again. In contrast, malicious behavior
records are never emptied, so every penalty calculation needs
to count all previous malicious behaviors.
The penalty made by the system is to block device access
requests, i.e., during a blocking period all access requests from
that device will be denied. Note that the blocking period is
not defined in actual timestamps, but a blocking time length
measured in blocks, calculated in the following exponential
function:
forbid = β−Ci , Ci < 0 (4)
where β (> 0) and takes 2 in our scheme. Since Ci is always
an integer due to practical restriction, forbid = 2−Ci , (Ci <
0) is an integer as well. It needs to be pointed out that, rather
than a duration, the penalty attribute used in MC and ACCs is
the block number of the last forbid block, denoted by TLFB,
calculated by adding forbid to the block number of the block
containing the access transaction.
There are some other issues that are worth mentioning.
Firstly, the credit of a device should not be related to the
activity level of the device. A device may not initiate a single
request over a short period of time, but this situation does
not necessarily correspond to a malicious behavior, and the
device credit value should not be affected. Secondly, Solidity,
the language used for Ethereum smart contract, does not
support floating-point in performing definition and calculation,
so we use a library that provides Quad-precision floating-point
operations. Finally, access requested before the last forbid
block will be reverted directly, as mentioned in section III-
A.
Fig. 3 is an example of the whole behavior list. The list is
organized in four parts: normal behavior list (LegalBehaviors),
malicious behavior list (Misbehaviors), beginning index of
LegalBehaviors (begin) and last forbid block (TLFB). The
two most important parts, LegalBehaviors and Misbehaviors,
have the same structure consisting of three parts (behavior ID,
block number corresponding to the moment when the behavior
appears, and current weight value). The behavior list can be
found using subject address (as key)
Fig. 3: An example of whole behavior list
We provide a reputation calculation algorithm shown in
Algorithm 2. In line 3, the behaviors are added in behavior
list. In line 4-13, credit is calculated according to formula
(1). In line 14-19, TLFB, the calculated block number of the
last forbid block is used to interact with MC. We still use
Solidity events to return values, where subject is the requester
address, behavior is the description of behavior passed in, bn
is the block number when the behavior appears, credit and
forbid are two values obtained during the algorithm runs. The
function that implements this algorithm can only be called by
ACC, which prevents interference made by outside users.
Only a single RC exists, so there is no self-destruct
operation–even the owner of RC cannot delete the contract.
There is another function named getLastBehavior() that can be
used to return the latest behavior. When we call this function, it
will read the last item of the behavior list based on a behavior
type number.
IV. FUNCTION VALIDATION
To demonstrate the feasibility of our solution, we have
implemented a smart contract template applicable for three
types of contracts. We will show the whole process of access
control and give the results based on a supply chain use case.
A. Testbed Implementation
Our experimental testbed includes a laptop and two Rasp-
berry Pi (3B and 3B+) modules, and the Quorum geth client
is installed on such devices to emulate blockchain nodes. The
details of these devices are shown in Table II. Four nodes as
Algorithm 2: reputation compute
input : subject, behaviorID, block number
output: subject, behavior, block number, credit, forbid
1 if requester is not ACC then
2 transaction revert
3 Add behavior to behavior list according to behaviorID
4 misLen← the length of malicious behavior list
5 for i← 0 to misLen do
6 wi ←MisBehavior[i].currentWeight
7 CN ← CN + wimisLen−i
8 legLen← the length of legal behavior list
9 for i← begin to legLen do
10 CP ← LegalBehavior[i].currentWeight
11 if CP > CPmax then
12 CP = CPmax
13 credit← λ1CP − λ2CN
14 if block.number > TLFB and behaviorID != 0 and
credit < 0 then
15 if LegLen > begin then
16 begin← legLen− 1
17 forbid← 2−credit
18 TLFB ← block.number + forbid
19 mc.updateEndBBN(subject,TLFB)
20 Trigger event isCalled(subject, behavior, bn, credit,
forbid)
the validators are running on the laptop, distinguished by their
port numbers. One of the nodes, called Judger is responsible
for deploying and managing the RC. In a real environment, the
Judger should be an authority, such as a government agent or
a trusted enterprise. Another one named Manager deploys and
manages the MC. The Manager also acts as a bank and is used
for transferring ether to a device when it joins the network for
the first time. The Raspberry Pi modules act as the gateways
(non-validators). In blockchain, a gateway represented by the
first account of its geth clients. As an agent of its child devices,
the gateway creates an account for each device connected to
it.
Now, let us consider the access control issue between the
two IoT devices on the pallet and truck, respectively. The
device on the pallet is managed by gateway 1 (emulated by
the Raspberry Pi 3B) and serves as a subject. It needs to send
a request to verify whether the truck is a correct one. The
device on the truck is managed by gateway 2 (emulated by
the Raspberry 3B+) and serves as an object. It is worth noting
that for cost-effectiveness, we simply allocated two accounts
on the testbed to represent the IoT devices on pallet and truck,
instead of using two real devices physically. Of course, in
a real-world supply chain, the process of data reading and
operations requires underlying intermediate code (middleware)
which is not implemented on our testbed.
To speed up our development work, we use Quorum Wizard
command line tool to set up a small Quorum network. We
utilize Remix to write and compile smart contracts, and use
Truffle to test functions. Besides, we adopt the deploy & plugin
in Remix to deploy contracts, and use web3.js to interact with
the corresponding geth clients. We use cakeshop to visualize
the blockchain and contract status. Finally, we create some
JavaScript files for sending access requests and monitoring
the results through Solidity event.
B. Experiment and Testing Result
A supply chain is typically an untrustworthy environment,
therefore it is an ideal use case to test our scheme. Specifically,
let us consider a simple use case of supply chain: moving
bananas on pallets by truck from a farm to a supermarket
distribution center [28]. In this scenario, the pre-installed
device on each pallet checks for whether it is loaded into
the right truck, or unloaded at the correct warehouse at every
stage of the journey. With the setting described above, we
conduct an experiment to test the proposed scheme based on
the supply chain use case. Ignoring some minor initialization
process, below are the major experiment steps.
• Step 1: Quorum blockchain establishment and initializa-
tion.
• Step 2: The Manager deploys the MC, the Judger deploys
the RC and registers it in the MC.
• Step 3: The Bank transfers 1 ether to the two gateway
nodes respectively.
• Step 4: The two gateway nodes create accounts separately
for the IoT devices, transfer 107wei (the unit of Ethereum
coin) to each device. Then, deploy ACC and register it
in MC using the device accounts.
• Step 5: The manager of device on the truck (gateway
2) sets access policies in its ACC to allow the device on
pallet to read the resource named ’basicInformation’. The
policy to be satisfied are shown in Table III.
• Step 6: The device on pallet (gateway 1) sends an access
request.
We should add the attributes in Table III to the contract
before sending a request. The access request and access
monitor are implemented by using JavaScript, and the scripts
are connected to Raspberry Pi through WebSocket rather than
operating directly in the Raspberry Pi modules.
The parameters involved in the reputation function are
defined as follows.
• In the penalty function, α0 = 2, α1 = 3 and α2 = 5,
implying that the third type of malicious behavior should
be given a higher weight;
• In the reward function, ω = 1 and CPi,max = 30;
• In the process of calculating credit value, λ0 = 0.5, λ1 =
0.5.
In order to input these parameters, we adopt the method of
decimal shift, since decimals are not allowed in Solidity. For
example, to input 1.34, use integer numerator 134 and integer
denominator 100, and then calculate the quotient from the two
integers.
TABLE II: Hardware details
Device CPU Operating System Memory Hard Disk
HP OMEN laptop 15 AMD Ryzen 7 4800H, 2.90 GHz Ubuntu 20.04 LTS 16 GB 512 GB
Raspberry Pi 3 Model B Plus quad-core ARM Cortex A53, 1.4 GHz Raspbian (Buster) 1 GB 32 GB (microSD card)
Raspberry Pi 3 Model B quad-core ARM Cortex A53, 1.2 GHz Raspbian (Buster) 1 GB 16 GB (microSD card)
TABLE III: Policy Definition
attrOwner attrName operator attrValue importance
subject farm name = EarthDance 0
subject good type = banana 0
object state = active 0
Fig. 4: One authorized access and three failed accesses from
ACC Event.
Our source code for the three smart contracts, JavaScripts
and experiment records is now available at Github 1. All
smart contracts are audited through MythX tool to secure the
contracts. A screenshot of requesting process is provided in
Fig. 4, where both the access authorized and failed accesses
are shown, and they all originate from the events triggered by
the ACC.
V. PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
In this section, we present some performance assessment
results based on experimental measurement. In particular, the
effectiveness of our solution in suppressing the growth of the
blockchain and the reputation mechanisms are demonstrated.
A. Gas Consumption
Gas consumption is such an important performance metric
used in many solutions with Ethereum smart contracts. It is
associated with real-world money and can accurately reflect
the cost of each operation. Subject attribute management is
handled by MC in our scheme and by subject contract (SC)
in Wang’s scheme, and the comparison of MC and SC is
1https://github.com/shuzang/BBRAC
shown by the first pair of bars in Fig.5. Resource attribute
management, policy management, access decision are handled
by object contract, policy contract and ACC, respectively, in
Wang’s scheme; while the three functions are all handled by
just one ACC in our scheme. We compare the cumulative
consumption of Wang’s three contracts and the consumption
of our ACC, yielding the second pair of bars in Fig.5. The
statistical results shown here are based on transaction cost
instead of execution cost.
Fig. 5: Gas consumption comparison
B. Access Time
Access time is another key performance metric, especially
for some applications with highly real-time requirements.
However, an access time actually depends on many factors,
like hardware and network. Although the consensus choice and
communication factor should have the greatest influence on the
access time, the impact of inter-calling between the contracts
cannot be ignored. Therefore, we measure the average access
time of over 500 requests for the cases with and without
reputation subsystem, and present comparison with Wang’s
scheme in Table IV.
TABLE IV: Comparison of average access times (ms)
No reputation system BBRAC wang’s scheme
Average time 626.82 667.36 693.48
Maximum time 990 2710 1960
Minimum time 570 550 600
C. Storage Pressure
The speed at which the blockchain volume grows is more
concerned with than many other issues. For blockchain so-
lutions applied in IoT, massive devices often mean massive
contracts, causing huge storage pressure on the blockchain.
We have reduced the storage pressure in the following three
aspects at the contract level: access model selection, design of
contract architecture, and the way of the function implemen-
tation. They are the key factors affecting a contract size.
In the following comparison, n denotes the number of
devices. In Zhang’s scheme [13], an ACC is deployed by a
device (object device) who wants to control the access requests
initiated by another device (subject device). The subject-object
pair can agree on multiple access control methods, and each
method is implemented by one ACC. With n object devices (or
subject devices), n(n− 1) subject-object pairs are generated.
In other words, we need to deploy n(n−1) ≈ n2 contracts in
the experiment. In Wang’s scheme [14], each policy contract
is created by a user, i.e., one policy contract corresponds to
one user. Assume each device belongs to a single user, so
there are n users and we need to deploy n contracts. Based
on contract deployment described above, we observe the actual
blockchain volumes versus the number of devices (unit: KB)
as shown in Fig. 6. The three schemes are Zhang’s that uses
ACL to achieve access control, Wang’s and ours (BBRAC).
Both of the latter two use ABAC model, and one can see that
they outperform Zhang’s scheme in storage consumption. It
is also observed that, as the number of devices increases, the
storage occupancy of our scheme increases slightly faster than
that of wang’s scheme, and this is mainly due to the inclusion
of the reputation subsystem. We believe it is worth having such
a subsystem at a small cost of additional storage occupancy.
Fig. 6: Blockchain volume growth
D. Reputation Subsystem
The reputation subsystem brings four mechanisms: reward,
penalty, tolerance and alarm. Among them, alarm can be
triggered by Solidity event if a threshold is defined in advance.
The impact of other three mechanisms can be seen in Fig. 7,
where the abscissa indicates the type of each access behavior,
and each bar corresponds to current cumulative number of
malicious behaviors. From a close watch at the plot, it can
be seen that the initial legitimate accesses accumulate some
reputation, then subsequent malicious behaviors lead to a
decline in credit value, triggering penalty at certain point. In
general, one can observe a few facts: 1) frequent malicious
behaviors result in credit value decreasing, which is a desired
outcome achieved through our design; 2) if repeatedly acting
maliciously, the number of forbid blocks has an exponential
growth trend; also the time that a device is forbid keeps
growing, because the log of historical malicious behaviors is
not cleared; and 3) when a malicious behavior occurs, if the
device has accumulated a high credit value, the behavior could
be tolerated. The observation 3 comes from our assumption
that an accidental harmful behavior is usually due to an
operational error and should be tolerable. To limit the tolerance
of operational errors, we have intentionally set an upper limit
on the credit value. The accumulation of legitimate access
can increase the credit value, but it remains unchanged after
reaching its upper limit.
Fig. 7: Change of credit value and number of forbid blocks
for a sequence of malicious and normal events.
Finally, one should know that reward and penalty bring
different results under two different situations, and both of
these results are desirable. The first situation is that there
are more requests to collect within a given duration (counted
in blockchain blocks) than the blockchain can do. In this
situation, the penalty mechanism can reduce the number of
transactions generated by nodes that behavior maliciously,
which, in consequence, gives more chance to well-behaved
nodes. The second situation is that the blockchain is able
to collect all requests generated within a given duration. In
this case, the reduction of transactions due to the penalty
mechanism helps suppress the growth rate of the blockchain.
We have conducted an experiment to test how much room
(measured in transactions) can be saved for the well-behaved
nodes. Access requests are sent by a node at a fixed time
interval until the blockchain grows by 500 blocks, with the
initial credit value being set to zero. Among the requests,
the first fifty all exhibit malicious behaviors that fail to pass
importance policy check. In a non-reputation system (without
using the reputation algorithm), the number of requests sent
over 500 blocks is 169, and all of these requests are collected
successfully, regardless of their behavior types. In contrast, in
a reputation system (enhanced by the reputation algorithm),
168 requests are sent over the same period of 500 blocks, and
only 130 requests are collected successfully, i.e, 38 requests
from the malicious node are blocked. In other words, under as-
sumption 1, 38 more requests from well-behaved nodes can be
collected, corresponding to an increase rate of 22.6%. With the
increase of malicious behaviors, this rate will further increase.
Indeed, having the malicious behavior detection mechanism is
in favor of legitimate nodes in the sense that the chance of
legitimate nodes’ successful transactions is improved.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we focus on the access control in the IoT
system and propose an improved smart contract-based frame-
work. We design and implement the ABAC model using smart
contracts and reduce the number of ACCs to ease the storage
pressure on blockchain. A supply chain use case is consid-
ered and tested on a small testbed. The experimental results
prove that execution times of some functions like attribute
management are reduced. In particular, the growth rate of the
blockchain volume is effectively curbed. The addition of the
reputation subsystem tightens the security of access at the
contract level. According to our experiment, the chance of
successful collection of transactions from the well-behaved
node is improved, thanks to the four mechanisms provided
by the reputation subsystem.
A blockchain system may be regarded as a distributed
database, but storing data on it is expensive. One natural
solution used by many researchers is that only crucial data
(attributes, policies or others) is stored on-chain and the rest
of the data is stored off-chain. People have used cloud or
distributed storage, like IPFS [29] and Swarm [21] as off-chain
storage platforms, and these techniques can be employed in
our proposed system. The usability of access control models
is another topic to study, considering that the IoT environment
is dynamic, and the attributes of devices can change over
time. Compared with the traditional models developed over
decades, such as CapBAC model that is also suitable for
the IoT environment, and XACML language that is used to
implement ABAC model, those based on smart contracts,
including what we have proposed, are still in their infancy.
The following are just a few that need to be researched in the
future: automatic update of attributes, automatic discovery of
attribute permission relationship, and improvement of smart
contract implementation.
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